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In the past two years, the Sinai-Peninsula-based militant 
group Wilayat Sinai (Sinai Province of the Islamic State, 
previously known as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, or ABM) has 
killed or injured hundreds of Egyptian security officials 
and civilians. These Islamic militants form by far the 
most active and dangerous armed group in Egypt. In 2015 
alone, Wilayat Sinai (WS) has claimed responsibility for 
numerous attacks on security facilities and checkpoints in 
northern Sinai; the successful missile attack on an Egyp-
tian navy patrol boat in July; the kidnapping and behead-
ing of a Croatian worker; and, most recently, the bombing 
in October of a Russian charter airplane. Despite the 
government’s ongoing counterterrorism campaign, ABM/
WS has been able to maintain its stronghold in northern 
Sinai and further expand its operational capacities. 
ABM/WS is a relatively new player to the Egyptian 
scene of politically motivated violence. The group 
emerged as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) in the northern 
parts of Sinai shortly after the 2011 revolution and has 
integrated large numbers of residents of the peninsula’s 
Northern Governorate, appealing in particular to mem-
bers of local Bedouin clans.1 One reason for its success 
attracting local residents into its ranks was its ability to 
capitalize on widespread bitterness in the local popula-
tion, which has experienced decades of economic neglect 
and state oppression.2 In addition to attacks on military 
and police targets, which seemed to be driven primarily 
by vengeance, the group initially focused on Israeli tar-
gets. As its original name indicated, ABM’s stated objec-
tive was the liberation of historical Palestine.3 To this end 
it launched several cross-border attacks and sabotaged 
the Egypt-Israeli gas pipeline several times. At the outset, 
AMB associated itself ideologically with Al Qaeda’s jihad-
ist ideology and hailed such Al Qaeda “icons” as Osama 
bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
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Since the ouster of President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, Egypt has seen a dra-
matic increase in terrorist attacks. The country’s military-led government has un-
dertaken massive counterterrorism operations in the Sinai Peninsula, where profes-
sionalization of terrorism has risen sharply in recent years. These include shoot-to-kill 
policy at checkpoints, curfews, the destruction of tunnels, and the arrest of sus-
pected terrorists. The government has evacuated entire residential areas and started 
building a buffer zone along the border with Gaza. Its harsh crackdown on the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the repression of any form of public dissent has also been 
at the core of its fight against terrorism. However, terrorist attacks still plague Egypt 
almost on a daily basis, and terrorism in Sinai has taken on particularly dire propor-
tions. Why is the Egyptian government failing?
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Morsi’s Ouster Provided New Impetus to Ter-
rorism in Sinai
The ouster of Mohamed Morsi and the subsequent bloody 
dispersal of pro-Morsi sit-ins in Cairo in the summer of 
2013, which left “at least 817 and likely more than 1,000” 
protesters dead, gave new direction to ABM.4 Although 
the group claimed it despised the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB) for participating in “the political game,” ABM 
sought to take advantage of the massive government 
crackdown on the MB and its supporters in order to 
present itself as the defender of Muslims, and it cited the 
crackdown as grounds for deliberately targeting the state. 
Subsequently, ABM increasingly and vehemently started 
to attack targets connected to the government.5 Whereas 
the bulk of attacks were concentrated in northern Sinai, 
ABM also undertook attacks in the Egyptian mainland. 
Among others, it targeted security headquarters in 
Mansoura. The geographical expansion of its attacks to 
the mainland was built on the clandestine network of 
ABM operatives in the Nile Delta who had been actively 
recruited in past years. It proved the emergence of an  
additional ABM stronghold outside Sinai.6
In November 2014, after months of heavy attacks 
against Egyptian security forces, ABM entered a new 
phase. It pledged allegiance (bayat) to the Islamic State 
(ISIS), changed its name to Wilayat Sinai (the Prov-
ince of Sinai, WS), and adopted a media strategy that 
closely followed ISIS, including publishing videos of ex-
ecutions.7 The declaration of allegiance to ISIS created 
an internal ideological rift between Al Qaeda loyalists 
and supporters of ISIS, however, which weakened the 
group’s internal structure and operational capacities 
in the early winter of 2014–15.8 Yet, as the develop-
ments of the past months have shown, ABM/WS has 
consolidated its position by taking on leadership of ISIS 
supporters. It has turned to more ruthless and ISIS-like 
tactics including attacks on civilians.9 Among others, 
civilian Sinai residents are increasingly being targeted 
for allegedly collaborating with the Egyptian military.10 
Even though ABM/WS might initially not have identi-
fied with the global goals of ISIS, its claim of responsi-
bility for the October 2015 bomb attack on the Russian 
charter plane that crashed over Sinai indicates that its 
aim of undermining the Egyptian government is com-
patible with ISIS’s objectives; ABM/WS, too, is willing 
to attack nationals of those countries, like Russia, that 
are fighting in Syria and Iraq against ISIS.
The emergence of ABM and its further radicalization 
as WS, a stated affiliate of ISIS, have posed an enor-
mous challenge to the Egyptian government’s counter-
terrorism efforts. Certainly, these efforts have fallen 
short of containing the militant uprising in northern 
Sinai. This essay examines the reasons behind the fail-
ure of the Egyptian counterterrorism campaign in the 
Sinai Peninsula.
The Egyptian War on Terror since 2013 
The Egyptian state has been waging a massive “war on 
terror” since mid-2013. Although ABM/WS has estab-
lished itself as the most active and dangerous armed 
group in Egypt, the Egyptian counterterrorism campaign 
has in fact been focusing on the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which it depicts as the mastermind organization behind 
all terrorist activities. In addition to extra-judicial secu-
rity practices such as a shoot-to-kill policy and torture, 
the Egyptian government under President Abdel Fattah 
el-Sisi has also introduced a set of repressive laws and 
policies. Borrowing from authoritarian rule of longtime 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak (1981–2011), the Pro-
test Law of 2013 and the Anti-Terror Law of 2015 grant the 
executive branch exceptional powers to clamp down on 
any political opposition. For instance, the new Anti-Terror 
Law’s vague definition of terrorism allows the govern-
ment to label any activity deemed as “harmful to public 
safety” an act of terrorism. This includes acts such as the 
distribution of pro-Morsi flyers. The law also imposes se-
vere fines on journalists who contradict official accounts 
of terrorist attacks. 
Entangled in the long legacy of the conflict between 
the state and the MB, the government has framed an 
extensive “war” against the MB and its supporters as the 
only way to eradicate terrorism and ensure Egypt’s se-
curity and stability. The powerful narrative of “Islamist/
MB terrorism,” which has been an important device for 
legitimizing the 2013 military-led coup against Morsi and 
solidifying the new ruling elite’s position, remains at the 
core of the security strategy. According to this line, the 
national counterterrorism campaign looks less like a care-
fully developed strategy based on credible evidence and 
more like collective punishment directed against those 
parts of Egyptian society who opposed Morsi’s ouster and/
or protested the subsequent political developments. This 
premise also informs the counterterrorism operations in 
Sinai. As such, it is the major policy- and strategy-based 
reason behind the Egyptian government’s failure to con-
tain Sinai-based militants. 
Since Morsi’s ouster, the government has launched 
several massive security operations to combat Sinai-based 
militants, which the Egyptian government has designated 
as vital aides to the MB despite the lack of credible evi-
dence. For the past two years the lives of north Sinai resi-
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dents have been dictated by government-imposed state 
of emergency, strict curfews, and a shoot-to-kill policy 
around security facilities. The Egyptian military has also 
destroyed dozens of tunnels under the Egyptian-Gaza 
border to further cut off logistical and operational coop-
eration between Sinai and Gaza-based militants. These 
counterterrorism efforts have, however, also borne strong 
implications of collective punishment of Sinai residents; 
security raids, demolition of homes, devastated farm-
lands, the forced eviction of thousands of Rafah residents 
from the buffer zone at the border with Gaza attest to this. 
Yet, despite these heavy-handed measures, ABM/WS does 
not appear to have been structurally diminished.
Flaws of Egypt’s Counterterrorism Campaign 
The Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, which restricts de-
ployment of Egyptian security personnel and equipment 
in Sinai, is often mentioned as one of the major impedi-
ments to a comprehensive counterterrorism operation in 
Sinai. Although it certainly plays a role, the success of the 
counterterrorism campaign does not hinge on it.11 Indeed, 
Israel has shown readiness to ease up on the restrictions 
several times since 2011, indicating that the limitations 
on Egyptian military presence in Sinai may be negotiated. 
Certainly, militancy in nearby Sinai is a pertinent security 
concern for Israel as well, for since its inception, ABM/WS 
has been explicitly and consistently hostile toward Israel. 
Instead of limitations connected to the peace treaty, it is 
rather the design of the counterterrorism campaign itself 
that seems to pose the most considerable challenge to the 
fight against Sinai-based militants. At least three major, 
interconnected flaws have undermined the success of the 
Egyptian government’s Sinai campaign. 
First, the counterterrorism campaign in the Sinai 
Peninsula is not suited to the conditions of guerilla-style 
combat. The militants are highly flexible and scattered in 
a large area of the northern Sinai. They are able to retreat 
into inaccessible hilly desert terrain but also to urban ar-
eas, where they hide among civilians. The counterterror-
ism operations, which rely heavily on F-16 jets and tanks, 
seem inappropriate for asymmetrical warfare and are, 
regrettably, causing large numbers of civilian casualties.
Second, the counterterrorism operations in Sinai 
cannot rely on the local population’s cooperation and 
intelligence. The practice of collective punishment, as a 
fundamental part of the government’s “iron-fist” strategy, 
enrages Sinai residents, motivates them to do anything 
but support the ongoing security operations, and, in in-
dividual cases, actually drives them to join the militants. 
The distrust and animosity toward the central govern-
ment that prevails among residents of northern Sinai goes 
beyond the current counterterrorism campaign, however. 
Ever since the Sinai was returned from Israeli occupation 
to Egyptian sovereignty in 1982, the peninsula has been 
viewed as a security area, and its residents have been 
considered an untrustworthy “fifth column.” This has 
been reflected in the government’s longtime negligence 
of Sinai’s economic development, with the exception of a 
few seaside resorts in the south. More than three decades 
of political marginalization, especially of the northern 
areas, has alienated Sinai residents from the central 
government. Their sense of resentment has been further 
fed by regular counterterrorism campaigns, to which the 
local population has increasingly fallen victim since the 
first decade of the 2000s.12 
Third, the national framework of the Egyptian “war on 
terror” has in fact been undermining security operations 
in Sinai, as it further boosts militant activities rather than 
fostering social and economic stability in the region. In 
particular, the repression of a large number of Egyptian 
civilians whose complicity in terrorism activities is, if 
anything, highly disputable, is providing ABM/WS with 
an aura of legitimacy; for the group claims to be fight-
ing an unjust political system. Moreover, the country’s 
complex counterterrorism policies, which leave no space 
for the peaceful expression of political concerns and toler-
ate no contest to the ruling class, arguably produces more 
enemies than they are able to contain. This is especially 
true of large numbers of frustrated, disenfranchised, 
young Islamists – who have thus far survived the waves of 
mass repression and who form a vital recruitment base for 
militant groups such as ABM/WS. 
Back to the Past? Does Deradicalization Of-
fer a Way Out?
Armed conflicts between the state and Islamists are 
nothing new in Egypt. The country experienced a lengthy 
period of fierce violence in the 1990s led by the groups Al 
Gamaa al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group, IG) and Egyp-
tian Islamic Jihad (EIJ). Like ABM/WS, both terrorist 
groups initially focused on security and government 
targets. Over time, however, they increasingly attacked 
the Egyptian Christian minority and foreign tourists in 
order to put greater pressure on Mubarak’s government. 
The government’s reply was a massive counterterrorism 
campaign and large-scale repression. Toward the end of 
1990s, the bulk of militant Islamists from these groups 
was either in prison or exiled. As a result, IG’s leadership 
unilaterally declared a cease-fire. This surprising decision 
started a process of collective deradicalization, which 
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eventually led the group to renounce violence. One of its 
major pillars was the publicly circulated revision of the 
group’s ideological tenets, especially those concerning the 
use of violence. In return for a revised ideological frame-
work, the government over time released thousands of 
IG’s members and affiliates. A few years later, in the mid-
2000s, the EIJ, with the exception of members who joined 
Al Qaeda, followed IG’s lead and also abandoned violence 
in exchange for Egypt’s promise to release its imprisoned 
members.
Even though ideological changes within IG and EIJ are 
cited as successful examples of collective deradicalization, 
there are legitimate doubts about its lasting effects. As 
the public accounts of revisionists released after the 2011 
revolution show, abandonment of violence and revising 
their main ideological tenets might have been a matter of 
pragmatism in a time of a crisis rather than being moti-
vated by real sense of repentance and change in world-
view. For instance, during the short-lived Morsi govern-
ment, Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, a prominent EIJ ideologue 
also known as Dr Fadl, reiterated the duty of Muslims to 
wage jihad and claimed that an armed struggle is useless 
as long as there is no capacity to conduct it properly. Both 
of these arguments are at odds with his previous “repen-
tant” views.13 Thus, even though Mubarak’s government 
might have been successful in inducing IG and EIJ to 
disengage from violence, the government’s long-term suc-
cess in changing militants’ beliefs is questionable.
The current Egyptian leadership could learn a lot if it 
critically reflected on this past deradicalization experi-
ence. So far the government has only been repeating one 
key facet of the 1990s experience, namely the massive 
repression and mass imprisonment of militants. Al-
though deradicalization experts usually agree on the 
necessity of a certain level of repression to bring about 
a strategic crisis of the targeted group, deradicalization 
is a complex process that cannot be achieved entirely 
through coercion. In this regard, the second key aspect 
of the Egyptian deradicalization experience, i.e., the 
ideological repentance of senior ideologues, can be 
particularly challenging. By declaring its affiliation with 
ISIS, the group ABM/WS became a part of ISIS’s net-
work and thus also became ideologically dependent on 
the transnational network of ISIS ideologues. Thus, even 
though the security forces might capture some of senior 
ABM/WS members and persuade them to revise the 
group views on the use of violence, ABM/WS’s ideologi-
cal anchoring within the wider regional ISIS framework 
might eventually marginalize the value of such repen-
tant views for their fellow combatants.
What Can Be Done?
Egypt’s counterterrorism campaign in Sinai is embed-
ded in a larger socio-political context. As much as the 
restrictions set up by the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty 
might appear at first sight as an obstacle to the cam-
paign’s success, the flawed design of the counterterror-
ism operation itself is the major reason for the Egyptian 
failure to contain the rise of Sinai militants. 
Egypt must revise its counterterrorism strategy to be 
more effective in its fight against ABM/WS. This, how-
ever, requires deep structural changes that go beyond the 
ambit of current security operations. Cooperation of the 
security forces with Sinai residents is crucial here, but 
such support cannot be secured as long as collective pun-
ishment remains the modus operandi of Egyptian coun-
terterrorism forces and as long as Sinai residents remain 
marginalized at the national level. To gain the trust of the 
local population, however, the Egyptian leadership must 
come up with more than redesigned counterterrorism 
operations. It has to succeed in persuading Sinai residents 
of its commitment to truly develop the area economically 
and socially.
In the national context, the government must take 
decisive steps to contain further radicalization. This 
requires revising the current repressive legislation, which 
severely restricts possibilities to peacefully engage in 
political and public debate. It also requires releasing  
political prisoners and respecting judicial procedures. 
Such reforms, however, presuppose an essential modi-
fication of the government’s approach to the political 
opposition, including the Muslim Brotherhood. The 
current Egyptian leadership must start to view peaceful 
political opposition as a partner, not an enemy. While 
the Islamic State’s attacks on Paris of November 13, 2015 
have certainly deepened the security concerns of Western 
states including Germany, fear of the spread of terrorism 
to Europe should not be a pretense for blindly accepting 
Egypt’s woefully inadequate and ineffective counterter-
rorism strategy. Instead, international actors should pres-
sure the Egyptian government to ease its restrictions on 
fundamental political freedoms in the country and sup-
port the release of political prisoners. Both are necessary 
prerequisites to prevent further alienation and radicaliza-
tion of peaceful dissent. 
Helena Burgrova is an associate researcher at the 
Institute of International Relations in Prague and a PhD 
candidate at Bundeswehr University in Munich. Her PhD 
thesis focuses on the Egyptian counterterrorism discourse 
during the reign of Hosni Mubarak.
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